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INTRODUCTION 
Tucked away in a corner of the Mediterranean is a country with one of 
the world’s most generous laws on compensation rights for declines in 
property values due to governmental planning decisions. As 
counterintuitive as this might seem, Israel’s1 jurisprudence gradually 
developed a legal doctrine about “regulatory takings” (to use an American 
term) that, viewed from a comparative perspective, represents an extreme 
in “property rights friendliness.” 
Israeli law regarding compensation for regulatory takings evolved from 
an almost dormant letter of the law into what is now a major legal 
doctrine. This evolution occurred without significant changes in 
legislation. Instead, it occurred through a series of Supreme Court 
decisions that interpreted the statutory language through an increasingly 
 
 
 1. The discussion here applies to Israel in its international borders, and not to the occupied 
areas. Different sets of laws and practices apply to the regions held by Israel and those administered by 
the Palestinian Authority. 
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property rights-enhanced perspective. The result has been the creation of a 
doctrine that addresses the right to compensation for many types of land-
use regulations. This doctrine has had an enormous impact on everyday 
planning practice, on the economics of real-estate development, on 
municipal budgets, and potentially on the macro-economy. 
This Article discusses the statutory law, its relationship to 
constitutional law, and the ways the courts have interpreted key elements 
of legislation. It also offers some hypotheses about factors that may be 
driving the steep increase in the number of claims and the impact this has 
had. Occasionally, the author’s views will be incorporated regarding 
suggestions for partial reform of what has become a runaway 
compensation scheme. 
A. A Brief History 
Israel inherited its planning law from the British Mandate that 
governed Palestine. The British introduced planning law into this quasi-
colony as early as 1921,2 soon after fighting subsided in World War I. 
That legislation was rudimentary, but in 1936 the British administration 
introduced a new and comprehensive law called the Town Planning 
Ordinance.3 This legislation molded Israel’s planning law and 
administration, and its largely positive influence is still apparent today. 
The right to compensation ultimately dates back to these early laws. 
The British colonial administrators brought with them from England 
the latest concepts in planning law. The question of how planning law 
should treat changes in property values caused by planning decisions on 
both the “compensation” and “betterment” sides of the equation was, at the 
time, a hot issue in Britain.4 Whereas in Britain, the law on these matters 
oscillated back and forth whenever a different party came to power, the 
law remained constant. The law granted compensation rights, which were 
probably intended to be highly limited, for injuries to property values 
caused by the approval of new or amended land-use plans. At the same 
 
 
 2. BENTWICH, NORMAN & DE MATTOS, LEGISLATION OF PALESTINE, 1918–1925, at 142 (W. 
Morris ed. 1926). 
 3. The Palestine Gazette: Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine, 1936, Add. 1, at 153. 
In the colonial structure, with the absence of a parliament, these and all other laws of the time were 
termed “ordinances,” but they should not be confused with subsidiary legislation.  
 4. See generally WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE RECAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 
(Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., Am. Soc’y of Planning Officials 1978). See also 
Malcolm Grant, Compensation and Betterment, in BRITISH PLANNING: 50 YEARS OF URBAN AND 
REGIONAL POLICY (Barry Cullingworth ed., 1999). 
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time, the British administration imposed a tax on the increase in property 
values.5 This ostensibly symmetrical set of rules was never intended to be 
truly symmetric, nor was it ever so in practice. But the ideology of 
“betterment and compensation,” long dead in Britain, still affects the 
contemporary interpretation of Israel’s compensation law. 
The 1936 Town Planning Ordinance established the right to 
compensation.6 It reads in relevant parts: 
Any person whose property is injuriously affected by [a] scheme 
[other] than the expropriation thereof may, within three months 
from the date at which the scheme comes into force by notice in 
writing served at the office of the Local Commission, claim 
compensation in respect of such injury . . . .7 
After the State of Israel was established in 1948, the 1936 Town 
Planning Ordinance (along with most other laws enacted by the British 
administrators) was kept intact and recognized as Israeli domestic law. 
When the Knesset (Israel legislature) finally enacted a new planning law in 
1965,8 it incorporated sections about compensation almost entirely. 
B. Constitutional Law 
In Israel, there is no single document called a “constitution.” Instead, a 
set of key decisions by the High Court of Justice9 or by the Supreme Court 
have incrementally established the country’s form of governance and most 
areas of civil rights. This set of decisions is known as Israel’s “Unwritten 
Constitution.”10 Beginning in 1958, the Knesset began a process of gradual 
 
 
 5. See Rachelle Alterman, Land Betterment Taxation Policy and Planning Implementation: 
Evaluation of the Israeli Experience, 2 URB. L. & POL’Y 201 (1979). See also Rachelle Alterman, 
Land Value Recapture: Design and Evaluation of Alternative Policies (Ctr. for Human Settlements, 
Univ. of British Columbia, Occasional Paper No. 26, 1982) (on file with author). 
 6. Town Planning Ordinance, 589 Palestine Gazette (1936). 
 7. Id. § 30(1). The three months period was later extended by the British to six months. 
 8. The Planning and Building Law, 1965, Sefer HaHukim [SH] 307, 467 (Isr.). All Israeli laws 
are published in Hebrew. Official but not legally binding English translations of Israeli laws are 
available in the Laws of the State of Israel (LSI). However, the LSI includes laws enacted only until 
the early 1980s. Because the planning law has been extensively amended since the 1980s, the author 
has used a commercially published translation with some adjustments by the author. For an official 
English translation of the Law (that does not include amendments passed after 1987), see The Planning 
and Building Law, 5725–1965, 19 LSI 330 (1964–65) (Isr.). 
 9. The High Court of Justice is composed of the same justices as the Supreme Court. The 
former hears petitions against government and quasi-government bodies, while the latter is the highest 
court of appeal.  
 10. For an analysis of Israel’s constitutional law, see Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to 
a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
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p121 Alterman book pages.doc6/7/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] RIGHT TO COMPENSATION IN ISRAEL 125 
 
 
 
 
codification of constitutional rules by means of a series of “Basic Laws”, 
initially intended to incrementally constitute a formal written constitution. 
As enacted, however, the status of each of these laws is only slightly 
different from a regular law.11 The role of the Supreme Court and its 
decisions on constitutional topics therefore remain of great importance 
within Israel’s legal system.    
Of the eleven basic laws, nine deal with the State’s principles of 
governances (elections, the Knesset, the court system, the government, the 
State Comptroller, etc.). The last two enacted, both in 1992, deal with civil 
rights. The more important of the two is “Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty.” Among its list of human rights are property rights. Some areas of 
civil rights still remain within the realm of the Unwritten Constitution and 
await future codification.12  
I. THE “UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION” AND THE STATUS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
Long before the “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty”13 was 
enacted in 1992, the Supreme Court repeatedly recognized property rights 
as holding “constitutional status.” In 1966, Justice Agranat stated: “One 
can say that the right to compensation not only carries today a universal 
character, but stands on a pedestal . . . of a ‘basic right.’ This is so even 
though there is no [written] constitutional dictum to this effect.”14 
This statement is still often cited by judges who wish to stress that the 
protection of property rights preceded the enactment of the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty. Interestingly, although Justice Agranat’s 
statement was made in connection with a physical expropriation (eminent 
 
 
309 (1995). 
 11. In the absence of any special procedure or jurisdiction for enacting constitutional laws, each 
of the Basic Laws is enacted as a free-standing piece of legislation by the Knesset just like any other 
law. Apart from their subject matter and the largely-symbolic expression of the word “basic,” most of 
these laws are not much different from regular laws. Some do, however, call for a special majority in 
order to revise or abolish one or more of their clauses (the definitions of special majority vary greatly). 
 12. The widely accepted explanation for why the Knesset has preferred not to enact a full “bill of 
civil rights” is the continuing absence of a national consensus (and therefore a majority in parliament) 
on marriage and divorce law. These remain the monopoly of religious courts (with a separate court for 
each religion). Most areas of civil rights have thus been left to the decisions of Israel’s rather activist 
Supreme Court, and to date, these have rarely been overruled by the Knesset. 
 13. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, Sefer HaHukim [SH] 1391, available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
 14. CA 216/66 City of Tel Aviv v. Abu Daia [1996] Piskei Din [IsrSC] 20(4) 520 (author’s 
trans.). None of the decisions in the planning area are available in official English translations. The 
author of this Article has translated or transliterated the names of parties in all the court cases cited in 
this paper. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p121 Alterman book pages.doc6/7/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:121 
 
 
 
 
domain) rather than a regulatory injury, it is often also cited in decisions 
on compensation claims for regulatory injuries.15 This is an illustration of 
an increasing tendency of the Supreme Court to blur the distinction 
between the law of expropriation and the law of “regulatory takings”16 by 
inserting the law of expropriation’s expectations for full or nearly full 
compensation into the law of regulatory takings. This is a further 
indication of the high regard in which the Israeli Supreme Court holds the 
right to compensation for regulatory takings. 
II. THE BASIC LAW: HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY 
Of all the Basic Laws, Human Dignity and Liberty, enacted in 1992 
(the “Basic Law”), is regarded by many constitutional scholars17 as 
holding the highest constitutional status accorded so far to any Basic Laws 
in Israel. Property rights are contained in section 3 of this legislation, 
which states: “There shall be no violation of the property of a person.” 
The wording of section 3 has no qualifiers; however, like all the other 
rights protected by the Basic Law, it is qualified by section 8. Thus, a 
violation of property rights is constitutional if the violation passes the 
following four conditions: (1) it is enacted in a law or in subsidiary 
legislation authorized by law; (2) it befits the values of the State of Israel; 
(3) it is for a proper purpose; (4) it is of an extent no greater than 
necessary. 
Existing laws, including the Planning Law, are “grandfathered in” by 
section 10 and do not have to pass the tests of section 8 anew. However, 
section 11 of the Basic Law obliges all government authorities, when they 
exercise their powers, to respect the protected rights. This means that the 
Basic Law applies not only to laws enacted since 1992, but also to those 
grandfathered in, including the Planning Law. Whenever the authorities 
have discretion over which avenue to choose, they should do their best to 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Additional Hearing 1333/02 Local Planning and Bldg. Comm’n of Raanana v. 
Yehudit Horwitz [2004] SCIs 58(6) 289 (author’s trans.). An “Additional Hearing” is a rare, second-
round hearing by the Supreme Court of its own decision that is reserved for select cases that raise 
major legal questions. 
 16. An analysis of the interrelationship between the law of expropriation and the law of 
compensation for regulatory injury to property value is beyond the scope of this Article. The 
relationship between compensation for regulatory injury and the law of compulsory dedication of up to 
forty percent of land parcels is especially complex. See Rachelle Alterman, Developer Obligations for 
Public Services in Israel: Law and Social Policy in a Comparative Perspective, 5 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 649 (1990). This topic continues to engage the courts and is still unresolved. 
 17. One such leading scholar is Justice Dr. Aharon Barak, who was the President of the Israel 
Supreme Court until 2006. 
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select the option that least encroaches on the rights protected by the Basic 
Law. 
The incorporation of the right to property into a constitutional law of 
this stature raised the degree of protection to an even higher level than the 
one already achieved by past Supreme Court decisions. In my view, 
however (not everyone agrees), where the law regarding regulatory takings 
is concerned, enactment of the Basic Law at an earlier date would likely 
have made only a marginal difference. This is because the Israeli Supreme 
Court had already delivered several important decisions on this issue by 
1992. These decisions interpreted major aspects of compensation law with 
a rather generous property-rights orientation. Since its enactment, section 
3 of the Basic Law has been cited in almost every court opinion as an 
additional legal basis for interpreting the right to compensation in a yet 
more generous way. 
Because the right to compensation, as interpreted by the courts, is 
already so broad, if the judge-made rules were to be codified in law, that 
legislation would have no problem surviving a section 8 challenge. If, 
however, the Knesset were to adopt some of the recommendations offered 
by this author18 so as to bring compensation rights for regulatory takings 
back to reasonable proportions, legislators would have to be convinced 
that the amended law would pass the tests of section 8. 
III. WHY THE DRAMATIC RISE IN THE NUMBER OF CLAIMS? 
Between 1936 and 1979, section 197 hardly troubled the courts. Very 
few claims for compensation were made at the time. With few exceptions, 
local and district planning commissions rejected those compensation 
claims that were actually made, and their decisions were rarely appealed to 
the courts. 
The low number of claims may be explained from a sociological 
perspective. For example, one explanation might be that the country and 
its people were relatively poor—Israel was considered a developing-
country at that time. In less-developed countries around the world, people 
are generally less litigious because litigation is expensive and requires a 
high degree of economic security. Another explanation for the small 
number of claims might be that Israeli society had been focused more on 
 
 
 18. The author has been asked to offer her recommendations to an inter-Ministerial team 
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Minority of Interior, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Ministry of Construction and Housing. The author’s recommendations are not the 
topic of this Article, but their general direction could probably be discerned from the discussion here. 
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state-building than on private interests. The individualistic ideology that is 
so dominant today in Israel, as in most advanced-economy countries, had 
not yet arrived in Israel in full force. 
But these explanations cannot account for why wealthy individuals and 
corporations did not claim more compensation before the 1990s. It is 
possible that the lethargy in decision-making by the local planning 
commissions deterred them. Data collected in the late 1980s19 showed that 
the local commissions were refusing all but a few claims. In the absence of 
a specialized appeals body, landowners had to appeal to the regular 
planning bodies. These bodies were not geared to handle such objections 
or appeals within any predictable time frame. 
Once claims became more prevalent, the courts had more opportunities 
to hear appeals, and they began interpreting the statutory law. The 
interpretations represented a very liberal perspective on property rights. As 
a result, more claims ensued.  
Another boost to the number of claims came in 1996, when an 
amendment of the Planning Law established six district-level appeal 
committees to hear appeals on the decisions of the local commissions, 
including those concerning compensation issues. With an efficient, 
outsourced administrative system and legislated time limits for reaching 
decisions, these committees have worked efficiently. Headed by an 
impartial lawyer, they act like tribunals and have authority to appoint a 
third appraiser to resolve differences between the appraisers for the two 
sides. The number of claims that reach these committees has increased 
sharply. Today, the cumulative claims for compensation are estimated to 
amount to billions of dollars. Not all of that money will be awarded, but 
parties continue to bring claims. 
The establishment of the appeals committees cannot, however, fully 
explain the dramatic increase in the number of claims and appeals. It is 
probable that the many cumulative changes in Israeli society, including 
more individualistic ethics, more government transparency, more lawyers, 
and a higher GDP per person, have all contributed to this dramatic change.  
 
 
 19. For a survey of the research conducted, see RACHELLE ALTERMAN & ORLI NAIM, PITSUYIM 
‘AL YERIDAT ‘EREKH MI-ḲARḲE’IN ‘EḲEV SHINUI TOKHNIT [COMPENSATION FOR DECLINE IN LAND 
VALUES DUE TO PLANNING CONTROLS] (Land Use Research Inst. & Ctr. for Urban & Reg’l Studies, 
Technion-Isr. Inst. of Tech. 1992) (Isr.) (on file with author). 
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IV. THE 1965 PLANNING AND BUILDING LAW AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
BY THE COURTS 
Even though the sections granting the right to compensation remained 
basically the same, other changes introduced in the 1965 Planning and 
Building Law (the “Law”) indirectly created a significant expansion of 
compensation rights in ways that the legislators may not have intended or 
anticipated. Foremost among these indirect effects is the introduction by 
the 1965 Law of two additional layers of plans: district plans and national 
plans.  
Sections 197 to 202 of the 1965 Planning and Building Law20 
collectively establish the right to compensation for adverse effects caused 
by the approval of plans. These sections also set out the procedure for 
claiming compensation. The language in the Law is very similar to the 
Town Planning Ordinance (the “Ordinance”). The Law adds procedural 
improvements and extends the period of time for submitting claims from 
six months to one year.21 The Law also grants the Minister of the Interior 
authority to extend this period. This is an authority that did not originally 
exist under the Ordinance.  
Although based in the Law, the depth and breadth of the right to 
compensation was in fact shaped by the courts. The task of interpreting the 
legislation reached the Supreme Court (and occasionally the High Court of 
Justice) in more than thirty cases as of April 2007.22 This indicates that 
there is a comparatively large body of jurisprudence for this issue.  
The key sections in the Law are sections 197 and 200. Section 197 lays 
the groundwork for claiming compensation, while section 200 deals with 
exemptions from the obligation to compensate. Interpretation of section 
197 was the focus of court decisions up to the 1980s and thus has been 
largely clarified. Since the 1990s, the focus of the Court’s attention has 
shifted to the conceptually more difficult and much more discretionary 
section 200. 
 
 
 20. Planning and Building Law, 1965, §§ 197–202. 
 21. This claims period was once again extended to three years by a 1995 amendment. See infra 
note 26 and accompanying text. 
 22. A cursory computer search in the Supreme Court’s database revealed thirty cases. Although 
this database does not systematically include cases before 1977, one can safely assume that there were 
only a few unaccounted for cases before 1977. In about twenty of the cases, the Supreme Court 
addressed major issues or made significant interpretative rulings. 
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A. Section 197: Establishing the Grounds for a Compensation Claim 
Section 197 sets out the elements for establishing a compensation 
claim.23 This section remains almost unchanged since it was enacted in 
1965 and is very similar to its original 1936 version. The first important 
Supreme Court decision interpreting this section (while it was still in its 
ordinance form) occurred in 1961, and since then, most elements of this 
section have been interpreted and clarified. The only major legislative 
change made to section 197 dates back to 1981, and it too is the result of a 
Supreme Court decision.24 Section 197 reads as follows: 
(a) If real estate located in or abutting on the area of a plan was 
adversely affected by that plan,25 [other] than by expropriation, then 
the person who was the owner of or holder of any right in that real 
estate on the day on which the plan came into effect shall be entitled 
to compensation from the Local Commission, subject to the 
provision of section 200. 
(b) Claims for compensation shall be filed with the office of the 
Local Commission within three years26 after the date on which the 
plan came into effect. The Minister of the Interior may, for special 
reasons which shall be recorded,27 grant an extension, even if the 
said three years have already expired.28 
The discussion of section 197 has been divided into six subparts: the 
preconditions for making a compensation claim, the definition of injury, 
the relationship between compensation and expropriation, indirect injuries 
to neighboring properties, who should pay the compensation, and 
reimbursement commitments from developers. 
1. The Preconditions for Making a Compensation Claim 
When discussing the preconditions for making a claim, there are five 
relevant issues: (1) the burden of proof, (2) who may submit a claim, (3) 
 
 
 23. The Planning and Building Law, 1965, SH 467 (Isr.). 
 24. See infra Part IV.A.4.a.  
 25. The phrases “located in or abutting on the area of a plan” and “by that plan” were added to 
the Planning law in a 1981 amendment. 1981, SH 1071, 1074. 
 26. The Planning and Building Law was amended in 1995 to extend the period for filing claims 
to three years instead of one year. 1995, SH 1544. 
 27. The phrase “special reasons which shall be recorded” was added in a 1995 amendment to the 
Law alongside the extension from one to three years. Id. 
 28. The Planning and Building Law § 197. 
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the types of planning decisions that may serve as cause, (4) the issue of 
information, and (5) the time limit. 
a. The burden of proof 
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the 
claimant is only required to carry the burden of establishing the basic 
conditions enumerated in section 197. Once these are established, the 
burden shifts to the authorities that wish to argue that they should be 
exempt in this particular case. The authorities must show that the 
particular claim passes the conditions of section 200.29 
Though seemingly only a procedural matter, this interpretation of the 
burden of proof has made it easier for landowners to win compensation 
claims. Because the Court’s interpretations of the other preconditions and 
conditions of section 197 are rather liberal and its interpretation of section 
200’s conditions for exemption have been rather strict, the chances for a 
landowner to win a compensation case are high.  
b. Who may submit a claim? 
Section 197 says that a claim may be submitted by “the person who 
was the owner of or holder of any right in that real estate on the day on 
which the plan came into effect.”30 The phrase “holder of any right in that 
real estate” has been incrementally broadened by the Supreme Court to 
include protected tenants, long-term leaseholders, and even farmers who 
hold only three-year automatically renewable right-of-use contracts on 
national land. 
A question hardly addressed by the courts is whether the right to claim 
compensation can be contractually transferred with the sale of the property 
rights, or whether only the original owner may claim it. One Supreme 
Court case contained dicta by two justices, who presented opposite 
positions on this issue.31 
 
 
 29. See Additional Hearing 1333/02 Local Planning and Bldg. Comm’n of Raanana v. Yehudit 
Horwitz [2004] SCIs 58(6) 289 (author’s trans.).  
 30. Planning and Building Law § 197. 
 31. CA 1968/00 Block 2842 Lot 10 Co. Ltd. v. Local Comm’n of Netanya [2003] SCIs 58(1) 
550. 
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c. What types of planning decisions are grounds for compensation? 
Another fundamental question is what types of planning decisions are 
grounds for compensation. Under Israeli law, only the approval of a plan, 
which usually means the amendment of an existing plan, may be a cause 
for a compensation claim. Until 1965, planning law recognized only local 
level plans (outline plans and detailed plans). The enactment of the 1965 
Law introduced two new, higher-level types of statutory plans: district 
plans and national plans. The legislators at the time probably did not 
anticipate that these types of plans would ever serve as grounds for 
compensation claims. Years later, national and district plans became the 
cause of thousands of compensation claims.  
There are three reasons why higher-level plans may entail large 
numbers of compensation claims. First, such plans often apply to much 
larger areas of land than the typical local plans (usually piecemeal 
amendments to previous local plans). Second, national and district plans 
often deal with regulations for open space preservation, or with NIMBY-
type infrastructure that entail negative impacts on neighboring properties. 
Third, the implementation of such plans often takes many more years than 
the implementation of local plans.  
This latter point is especially problematic because the three-year time 
limit applies to any type of plan. Many of the higher-level plans are not 
site-specific in scale. Therefore, landowners cannot prove that the 
injurious regulations will indeed apply to their properties once local plans 
are approved.  
The jurisprudence on this key issue is sparse and contradictory. Some 
courts have denied compensation claims for national or district plans, 
holding that landowners should wait until the depreciation in value 
becomes concrete. Most courts, however, have ruled that if landowners do 
not claim compensation for the declines in value due to the more general 
or higher-level plans, they will forfeit that part of the decline. 
The issue of whether compensation claims may be submitted against 
higher-level plans was dormant for many years. But since the approval in 
2006 of a comprehensive national plan and the revision of the Central 
District plan (both actions were intended to conserve the last remaining 
open spaces in the densely inhabited regions), this issue has become a 
major concern for planners and environmentalists. The Supreme Court has 
not yet addressed this key legal question in any depth. 
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d. What types of planning decisions are not compensable? 
Some types of decisions by planning bodies are not covered by section 
197 and are therefore not compensable. Only final approval of a new or 
amended plan creates the right to claim compensation, even if the approval 
process takes many years. This may be one of the reasons why many local 
authorities tend to drag on the plan approval process for many years. 
Similarly, a slate of other types of decisions is also non-compensable 
even when the decisions cause declines in property values either directly 
or to neighboring lands. These types of decisions include the approval of a 
subdivision plan, the granting of a variance or a nonconforming use 
permit, and the imposition of conditions in a building permit. Refusal to 
grant a building permit in and of itself does not provide grounds for 
compensation; if the plan in force is injurious, the claim should be made 
against it.32 
e. How should landowners be informed? 
The failure to directly inform landowners is the weakest point in the 
law’s otherwise generous scheme to protect property rights. When 
approving injurious plans, the authorities have no additional obligation 
beyond the regular information requirements. There is no stage in the plan 
approval process where authorities are obligated to serve personal notices 
to potentially injured landowners. This is so even if the injury is extensive, 
such as where a buildable plot is rezoned for public open space (but not 
yet expropriated). Contrast this with physical expropriations where a 
personal notice must be served once the authorities have decided to take 
the property.  
Approval of a plan, which is a precondition for submitting a 
compensation claim33 and sets off the countdown of the three-year time 
limit, only requires the publication of a standard notice in daily 
newspapers announcing that a particular plan has been approved. The 
same requirement applies to the pre-approval “deposit for public review” 
stage. The size of such notices is usually not much larger than two postage 
 
 
 32. Under Israeli planning law, building permits must fully accord with the statutory plan and 
there is a general presumption that a building permit should usually be granted “as of right” if it fully 
accords with the plan in force. If a permit is denied, the interested party may try to petition the court to 
order the authorities to issue the permit. The degree of discretion allowed to planning authorities in 
refusing building permits that ostensibly accord with the plan in force is a difficult and separate issue 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 33. See supra Part IV.A.1.c. 
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stamps. Since 2004, there is also a requirement that notice about every 
deposited plan be physically posted at or near the site in question. This is 
certainly an improvement; however, it does not ensure that the landowners 
who will most likely incur the injuries will see the notices and understand 
their impact.  
The inadequate information obligation is at odds with the rather 
generous compensation rights granted to holders of property rights in 
Israeli. This disparity has social implications. As in any society, access to 
governmental information in Israel is often correlated, at least in part, with 
socio-economic factors, such as the capacity to hire professionals to 
monitor and understand the laconic announcements. Therefore, the 
authorities should be required to send personal notice where a significant, 
high-probability injury is anticipated. Unless information is provided 
proactively, the distribution of compensation claims is bound to be 
unequal on socioeconomic lines. 
f. The time limit 
Presently, the statutory time limit is three years after the injurious plan 
is approved.34 Until 1996, when the time limit was one year, the Minister 
of the Interior was quite generous in granting extensions. There were few, 
if any, petitions to the High Court of Justice on this issue.  
However, when the Law was amended in 1995 and the time limit was 
increased to three years, the legislature’s intent was that the Minister’s 
discretion be reserved for “special reasons which shall be recorded.”35 
Since then, there has been an administrative policy to be less generous in 
awarding requests for extensions.36 Nevertheless, the Minister still has 
wide discretion.  
The few petitions heard by the High Court of Justice on this issue have 
displayed a rather strict approach. This approach is at odds with the 
Court’s otherwise liberal interpretation of the law. A petition denied by the 
High Court in 2003, Moshav (Cooperative village) Neve Yamin vs. 
Minister of the Interior,37 highlights the inequality that may arise from the 
 
 
 34. See supra note 26 and accompanying statutory text. 
 35. The Planning and Building Law, 1965, § 197(b) (Isr.).  
 36. As these decisions for extension are based on the individual discretion of the Minister, the 
scope of the discretionary policy has changed and depends on the person who holds the Minister’s 
office. 
 37. HCJ 156/01  Moshav (Cooperative village) Neve Yamin vs. Minister of the Interior [2003] 
Piskei Din [IsrSC] 57(5) 289. The Minister of the Interior rejected an extension request by the 
members of a cooperative village whose properties were injured by a national-level plan for high-
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absence of an active notification duty in order to ensure equal information 
within the time limit. Despite the clearly inequitable outcome exemplified 
by the Neve Yamin decision, the village’s request for an Additional 
Hearing was denied. However, the same justice who delivered the denial, 
Justice Cheshin, also expressed his strong dismay with the starkly unequal 
distribution of injuries that resulted in this case.38 However, neither he nor 
the three judges who earlier decided on the petition pointed out that the 
reason for the inequality was the absence of an obligation to inform 
landowners. The Court did not call upon the Knesset to amend the law so 
as to require proactive notification, at least in cases (such as in the Neve 
Yamin case) where there is a certain and severe injury and where gross 
disparities will result among landowners if they do not all have access to 
the same information. 
2. The Definition of Injury and Its Implications 
a. What is an injury? The basic rule 
An injury is measured by comparing the appraised economic value of 
the property under the previous plan to its value under the new or amended 
plan. The claimant has to show a causal link between the approval of the 
new plan and the injury. The injury is not to be assessed “horizontally,” 
that is, in comparison to what similar lots may have been granted.39 
Rather, injury is calculated only by comparing the “before” and “after” 
value of the specific plot in question.  
 
 
voltage electricity lines. At the time that the plan was approved, the law prescribed a one-year time 
limit, but soon after, the law was amended to the three-year limit. Thinking that the new time limit 
applied, the village representatives procrastinated in submitting the claim.  
 Other villages impacted by the same plan under similar circumstances were also late in submitting 
their claims, but they were not as late as Neve Yamin. The Minister did grant the other villages 
extension, and these villages were included in the compensation arrangement.  
 The Minister argued that the differentiation was a legitimate decision, not a discriminatory one. 
He explained to the Court that the time scale reflected two things: the fact that the Israel Electric 
Corporation had agreed to indemnify the local authorities (who otherwise would have had to pay the 
compensation) and the fact that the company had decided to include only those claims (including those 
of the other villages) that were submitted before a specific deadline (also well beyond the one-year 
time limit). Needless to say, the corporation most likely did not publicize the deadline; however, the 
petitioner did not make this point. The village argued that the Minister should have taken into account 
the discriminatory outcomes in this case. The Court accepted that financial considerations of the 
Electric Authority were enough to justify the differentiation made by the Minister. 
 38. Request for Additional Hearing 6542/03, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/. 
 39. One can, of course, also petition the High Court of Justice on administrative law grounds. For 
example, a petition may claim that a decision is discriminatory, unreasonable, or constitutionally or 
administratively flawed. This Article, however, will not discuss these topics. 
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A leading case on this point is Birenbach v. Tel Aviv,40 which was 
decided in 1987. As part of Tel Aviv’s pioneering attempts at historical 
preservation, the owner of a building known as the “Pagoda” was denied a 
request for additional development rights. Other plots in the area that did 
not have buildings warranting preservation had received approval for 
rezoning with additional development rights. The Supreme Court ruled on 
appeal that Birenbach did not have a right to receive compensation 
because the existing plan had not been altered. Thus, landowners do not 
have the right to demand that an amendment be approved.41 
American readers will note that the concept of “highest and best use” is 
not a criterion under Israeli compensation law. Thus, the right to 
compensation cannot be claimed simply for the denial of a “rezoning” 
request. 
b. Should land values reflecting expectations for “upzoning” be 
taken into account? 
The simple definition of injury, which compares the “before new plan” 
and “after new plan,” is not as clear as it might seem. Recent efforts to 
protect the few remaining contiguous open spaces in Israel’s high density, 
central areas have increasingly imposed challenges to this rule. Similar 
questions have arisen regarding planning initiatives to designate existing 
buildings for historical preservation. The issue is whether the value of an 
anticipated “upzoning” should be taken into account.  
The most common situation is where land that was previously 
designated as “agricultural” is now redesignated as a “preserved open 
space.” Even though all existing farming and related rights remain intact, 
land appraisers can still show that the market value of the land has 
suffered a decline because the likelihood of the plot being redesignated as 
buildable land has been greatly reduced.42 
 
 
 40. CA 483/86 Birenbach v. Tel Aviv Local Comm’n [1987] IsrSC 42(3) 288. 
 41. The Court did not, however, rule out the possibility that there might be an injury when an 
amendment to an existing plan “closes the lid” on expectations for a rezoning. However, this was not 
the appellants’ argument in the case before the Court. Had this decision been made today, the case may 
have been argued (and possibly also decided) differently. 
 42. See CA 4390/90 Eliashar v. Israel IsrSC 47(3) 872. The appellant claiming compensation 
held property rights in an area previously zoned for agriculture, but the new plan declared the area a 
national park. The agricultural and related rights remained. Furthermore, the municipality had 
proposed a type of “clustering,” which would have enabled some development rights. The Court did 
not rule out the argument that declaring the area a national park would “close the lid” on possible 
rezoning in the future. 
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A 2003 Supreme Court decision43 suggests that where rezoning is not a 
remote probability, the loss of “anticipation value” should be taken into 
account in determining the degree of injury. However, this issue has not 
yet been resolved through the case law.  
The question of anticipated value sometimes coincides with the issue 
discussed above, regarding what level of plans may create a cause of 
action and what degree of certainty is required.44 What should the law be 
when property values are allegedly diminished by a plan that requires the 
approval of a more detailed plan (whether on the local or a higher level) 
before the extent of injury becomes certain? With planning efforts being 
increasingly devoted to protecting scarce open spaces and with Israel’s 
high land prices and relatively high growth rates, the question of whether 
or when “anticipated value” constitutes an injury under section 197 will 
require clearer jurisprudence. If a broad definition is adopted, as is likely 
under the logic of the current jurisprudence, the fiscal and economic 
impacts will be enormous as the number of claims against such plans 
keeps on rising. Planning bodies will, in some cases, have no choice but to 
compromise or withdraw plans for open space preservation. 
c. Should assessment of an injury take into account site-specific 
circumstances? 
The Supreme Court has interpreted “injury” broadly to include special 
circumstances that may render a particular plot more sensitive to an injury 
than an otherwise identical plot.45 Relevant factors might be physical or 
contractual.  
For example, an existing plot currently designated for commercial use 
is redesignated in an amended plan for residential use. The existing plot 
currently happens to have a commercial building on it, whereas an 
adjacent plot that is similarly redesignated does not. Regarding the empty 
plot, the decline in land value is small because it is empty. However, in 
order for the built-up plot to be developed according to the new plan’s 
land use and design regulations, the commercial building would have to be 
demolished. The Supreme Court would likely decide that these costs 
should be added to the compensation claim.  
 
 
 43. CA 1968/00 Block 2842 Lot 10 Co. Ltd. v. Local Comm’n of Netanya [2003] SCIs 58(1) 
550. 
 44. See supra Part IV.A.1.c. 
 45. CA 761/85 Lifshitz v. Local Comm’n for Rishon leZion IsrSC 46(1) 342. 
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d. Is there a need to demonstrate a direct loss? 
Under Israeli law there is no need to demonstrate that the landowner 
has incurred a direct loss; the decline in value may remain “on paper.”46 
Thus, it does not matter at what price the land was purchased by the 
person claiming compensation, nor does it matter whether that particular 
person will suffer a direct loss when the plot is sold.  
What would be the result if a landowner had built up only part of the 
development rights and the plan is revised after three decades so that only 
the built-up rights are allowed and the “extra” development rights are 
abolished? In addition, suppose that the original landowner still owns the 
land and has not taken any action to utilize the remaining rights. Under 
current Israeli jurisprudence, the landowner will be eligible for 
compensation.47 There is no statutory time limit for implementing the 
original development rights, nor is there a doctrine that requires proof of 
“investment-backed expectations” or any other direct losses.  
It likely makes no difference, at least for establishing a cause of action, 
whether the landowner knew that an injurious amendment would soon be 
approved and went ahead and purchased the plot. Nor is it likely to matter 
if the owner has not taken any active steps to reduce the injury.  
Israel’s compensation law sounds like a wonderful real estate insurance 
policy. As surprising as this may seem to most readers, the issues raised 
here have been addressed only marginally by the courts. It is likely that 
some of these additional tests could be developed under the types of 
exceptions in section 200, especially through the interpretation of the 
“injustice” clause.48 However, the courts have not gone in this direction at 
this time. Thus, Israeli compensation law does act like a wonderful real 
estate insurance policy. 
3. The Relationship Between Compensation for a Regulation and for 
an Expropriation 
Those accustomed to the way in which the “takings issue” is often 
framed under U.S. constitutional law might be baffled by the section 197 
 
 
 46. This question is clearly articulated as an obiter dictum in the Block 2842 Co. Ltd. decision; 
however, the two judges who discuss it take opposite positions. See supra note 43.  
 47. For a Supreme Court case similar to this hypothetical, see CA 6826/93 Local Planning 
Commission for Kfar Sabba v. Hayat. IsrSC 51(2) 286. The rationale of this decision is cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court in the Block 2842 Co. Ltd. decision; see supra note 43.  
 48. See infra Part IV.B. 
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clause “otherwise than by expropriation.”49 Much of American takings 
jurisprudence concerns the need to determine when a regulation goes “too 
far” so as to amount to a “taking.” Does the wording of section 197 imply 
that in Israeli law, a bright line distinguishes the right to compensation 
when there is an expropriation from the right to compensation for a 
regulatory injury (i.e., a plan is revised)? In reality, the takings issue in 
Israeli compensation law manifests itself in a form that is distinct from the 
American example and does provide a “brighter line.” However, Israeli 
courts have had to perform legal acrobatics in order to decide on cases 
involving the complex relationships of land-use regulation (plans), 
expropriation, compulsory dedication of land,50 developer agreements,51 
and land readjustment.52 Only one aspect of this relationship is discussed 
here.  
a. The problem 
Neither planning law nor expropriation law53 directly addresses the 
situation in which land in private hands is designated for a typically public 
use, such as a road, a school, or a park, long before expropriation 
procedures actually take place. Such a redesignation often entails a sharp 
decline in the value of the property, often representing a larger 
depreciation than will occur when the expropriation decision will finally 
be announced. The long wait between the time of the land-use designation 
and the actual expropriation is a problem for landowners in many 
countries. Local governments often lack the funds for compensation for 
the full value, or they are reluctant politically to undertake expropriation. 
Sometimes, government administration is simply lethargic. 
Which right to compensation may a landowner invoke in the interim 
stage, before expropriation? Is it the right to compensation under section 
 
 
 49. See The Planning and Building Law, 1965, SH 467 (Isr.). 
 50. Rachelle Alterman, Developer Obligations for Public Services in Israel: Law and Social Policy 
in a Comparative Perspective, 5 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 649 (1990). 
 51. For an expanded version of the above paper, see Rachelle Alterman, From Expropriations to 
Agreements: Developer Obligations for Public Services in Israel, 24 ISR. L. REV. 28 (1990).  
 52. See Rachelle Alterman, More Than Land Assembly: Land Readjustment for the Supply of 
Urban Public Services, in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 37 (Yu-Hung Hong and Barrie Needham eds., Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy 2007).  
 53. Detailed analysis of the Israel law of land expropriation (“eminent domain”) is beyond the 
scope of this Article. In a nutshell, jurisprudence in this area has evolved greatly since Israel’s early 
decades. Until the late 1990s, no land expropriation decision was ever nullified by the courts. But after 
a landmark decision was delivered in the late 1990s, the jurisprudence is leaning to the other extreme. 
If a case with facts similar to those in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) were to come 
before an Israeli court today, the decision would probably take the minority’s position. 
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197 of the Planning Law or the right to compensation under the legislation 
governing expropriation? In Israel’s early decades, local governments 
relied on this ambiguity, hoping to avoid having to pay for the loss in 
value due to the change in land-use designation in the first stage, which is 
often responsible for the bulk of the decline.54 These government bodies 
based their position on section 197’s phrase “otherwise than by 
expropriation.”55 They interpreted this phrase to mean that the entire 
process leading to expropriation, including land-use redesignation, is 
exempt from the compensation obligation in section 197. Local 
governments argued that at the time of expropriation, compensation 
should be based on a comparison of market value “on the eve of 
expropriation” and thereafter.56 Thus, the proposed interpretation would 
have denied landowners the right to claim compensation under section 197 
whenever property was designated for public use as the first stage towards 
expropriation. 
b. The two-stage compensation doctrine 
As early as 1961, the High Court of Justice came to landowners’ 
rescue. To the chagrin of government authorities, the Court accepted a 
petitioner’s interpretation of the “otherwise than by expropriation” clause. 
The Court ruled that section 197 does apply to the rezoning stage. Aware 
that it was providing just a “patch” to cover a major gap, the Court called 
upon the Knesset to amend the law. However, the Knesset has not done so. 
Thus, the High Court created “the two-stage compensation” doctrine, 
which became entrenched in law and practice. Most real estate and 
planning practitioners and legislative advisors seem to have forgotten that 
the judges intended the ruling to be a temporary solution. One flaw is that 
landowners have the right to personal notice only at the second stage, 
which is often the least valuable stage. Because a claim for the first stage 
has a time limit of three years,57 and before 1996 only one year,58 the 
 
 
 54. See Administrative Petition (Administrative Court for the Northern District) 04/001025 Local 
Comm’n for Afula v. Mordechai Ziv [2005] (on file with author). This case demonstrated that 
government bodies, like the Transportation Authority, still rely on the ambiguity between section 197 
and expropriation law to attempt to reduce compensation paid out to landowners. Although this 
particular case involved expropriation according to a law that was more archaic than the Planning 
Law, the Administrative Court of Northern District in Nazareth adapted the two-stage doctrine from 
the Planning Law (see infra Part IV.A.3.b) and ruled that the landowner should be fully compensated.  
 55. The Planning and Building Law, 1965, § 197 (Isr.).  
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra note 26 and accompanying statutory text. 
 58. See supra note 26 and accompanying statutory text. 
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landowner may forfeit the right to claim compensation for the period in 
which the most significant decline in value occurs. Furthermore, because 
the two-stage solution is not intuitive, even landowners who find out about 
the new plan on time might logically think that they should await 
expropriation before claiming compensation. Finally, the two-stage 
solution is a two-stage hassle with two sets of costs for the property 
owners to pay. 
Given the inadequacy of the “two-stage compensation doctrine,” there 
are two alternative solutions: provide for full compensation at the first 
stage (plan amendment), or provide for full compensation at the second, 
physical expropriation stage. Assuming some landowners would not want 
to wait for the latter stage, the logical solution is to grant them the right to 
oblige the authorities to buy the property at an earlier stage than they had 
intended. This type of right, known as a “blight notice” in British and Irish 
law, is anchored in the laws of many other countries, including many 
represented in this Symposium, but not in Israel.59 
4. Do Owners of Neighboring Properties Have the Right to 
Compensation? 
In the 1979 case Varon v. Jerusalem Local Planning Comm’n,60 the 
Court delivered its most dramatic decision interpreting the language of the 
law. Varon had the greatest direct impact on the expansion of 
compensation rights. Although it took a decade or more for the Varon 
decision to impact landowners’ behavior, the case set the legal stage for 
the huge leap in the number of claims. The Varon decision was also the 
only one that led to an amendment to the legislation. 
a. The Varon case 
In Varon, the appellant’s lawyer61 argued that the right to 
compensation under section 197 is not restricted to the properties to which 
a plan amendment applies directly, but extends to any property affected by 
the change, regardless of location. Varon was the Supreme Court’s first 
decision pertaining to the geographic extent of the right to compensation; 
 
 
 59. In 2006, the author made a similar proposal to an Israeli government steering committee 
responsible for revising the planning law. 
 60. CA 603/77 Varon v. Jerusalem Local Planning Comm’n SCIsr 33(3) 409. 
 61. See id. Naomi Wal, the lawyer who successfully presented this novel argument was regarded 
as a section 197 specialist after Varon. 
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before Varon, there were only a handful of prior decisions of any type 
touching on section 197. 
The case involved a low-rise home in Jerusalem in a prime location 
with a view of the Old City Wall. An adjacent plot was rezoned from 
“low-rise residential” to “high-rise commercial.” Because a high-rise 
building would block the view and increase noise, the property suffered an 
immediate decline in market value. The plan with the rezoning did not 
apply to Varon’s parcel. 
At the time the case was being heard, section 197 said, “If real estate 
was adversely affected . . .” without reference to whether the right to 
compensation applied only to the property subject to the amended plan or 
whether the right to compensation included adjacent or distant properties 
that might suffer a decline in value due to the amended use or density 
approved for another plot. 
The three judges who composed the court for this decision62 were split 
on this issue. The opinions were both thorough and philosophical, 
demonstrating that the judges were keenly aware they faced a major legal 
and ethical question.  
The majority view held that, in the absence of any geographic 
stipulation in the legislative text, the right to compensation should be 
interpreted broadly to apply to any and every geographic location, as long 
as a causal relationship between the new or amended plan and the decline 
in value could be shown. 
The judges in the majority offered two key arguments for this position. 
First, they noted the need for a just distribution of the burden. When a 
planning commission approves a new or amended plan for the public 
interest, an individual owner should not have to bear the financial brunt; 
the public should pay compensation.  
Second, the majority reasoned that the need to pay compensation 
would encourage the planning authorities to be more careful when 
considering a plan that will likely cause negative externalities to the 
neighbors. Since Varon, these justifications have been offered in many 
court decisions concerning compensation rights for both direct and indirect 
injuries. 
In Varon’s minority opinion, Justice Aharon Barak63 found that the law 
grants the right to compensation only where the government alters the 
normative status (the plan) that directly applies to a given parcel. Justice 
 
 
 62. All three justices were among Israel’s greatest judges—Haim Cohen, the Deputy President at 
the time, Shamgar and Barak, both of whom later became Presidents of the Supreme Court. 
 63. Justice Aharon Barak later became the President of the Supreme Court and retired in 2006. 
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Barak argued that a direct injury should be distinguished from an indirect 
one. He suggested that with direct injuries, the reduction in property value 
is caused by the change in the regulation itself, whereas, in the second 
case, the reduction is created not by the plan but by the anticipation that 
the use of the neighboring plot will harm the value of the parcel at issue. 
Recognizing the impact that a ruling in favor of Varon would entail, the 
President of the Supreme Court granted the Jerusalem Local Planning 
Commission’s request for an Additional Hearing—a rare procedure 
reserved for the most important issues on which the Court is split.64 An 
Additional Hearing is held with a greater number of judges—in this case 
two more judges were added to the original three.  
In the Additional Hearing of Varon,65 the Supreme Court once again 
split, but the majority upheld the Court’s prior decision. The majority 
opinion meant that if landowners anywhere in the city or region could 
demonstrate that their land value had declined as a result of the approval 
of a new or amended plan, they would have cause for claiming 
compensation from the local planning commission. 
Justice Barak, joined by a second justice, wrote the dissenting opinion. 
It is the more reasonable interpretation of the Israeli legislature’s intent in 
1965 as well as the intent of the British predecessors in the 1936 
legislation.  
The majority opinion, however, became an entrenched and uncontested 
doctrine. For twenty-five years, its rationale was not revisited by anyone 
from the judicial, legal practice, or academic milieus. Since 2006, 
however, this topic has resurfaced and is the subject of intensive 
professional and public discussion.66 
The majority’s interpretation is an out-of-context interpretation of 
British colonial legislation. The majority’s opinion lacks grounding in the 
historic sources of the British legislation, and fails to inquire whether 
similar laws enacted by the British in other colonies were ever interpreted 
in the same manner. Furthermore, the majority’s relentlessly broad 
interpretation of the right to compensation is unsupported by research into 
current compensation rights in other democratic countries.67 
 
 
 64. This was not the last time that Additional Hearings would be granted in cases concerning 
regulatory takings issues. 
 65. See Additional Hearing [CA] 28/79 The Local Planning and Bldg. Comm’n for Jerusalem v. 
Varon. 
 66. This is a result of this author’s initiative and recommendations, submitted in 2006 to a 
government interministerial committee, and based on this author’s comparative research.  
 67. Such comparative research would show that most democratic countries do not allow 
compensation rights for indirect injuries due to planning decisions. 
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One can only speculate as to the majority’s rationale behind extending 
compensation rights to landowners of neighboring plots. It should be 
understood against the backdrop of the collectivity focused legacy of 
Israeli society in the country’s formative years. The judges in the majority 
view may have been motivated by an unarticulated quest to balance the 
Court’s earlier orientation toward public property interests, often at the 
expense of private property rights. Maybe the justices felt that a broader 
definition of compensation rights would create a better equilibrium. The 
majority decision in Varon was the first sign of the orientation that, in later 
years, evolved into the property rights protectionism reported here.  
Whatever the majority’s underlying reasoning was, the Court surely did 
not anticipate the far-reaching impact its decision would have. At the time 
of the Varon decision, the number of claims throughout the country was 
very small. Subsequent research indicates that there were still no claims 
for indirect injuries a decade after the Varon decision.68 
b. After Varon 
The Varon decision received little media attention at the time it was 
handed down. However, the national government realized this decision 
might unleash a wave of compensation claims that would impose a severe 
financial burden on both local authorities and the national budget. In 
response, the government quickly drafted a bill to amend the Planning and 
Building Law in order to clarify that compensation rights applied only to 
direct injuries.69 The Knesset, however, preferred a compromise between 
the Court’s interpretation and the government’s wishes. The resulting 
1981 amendment declared that compensation rights would be extended to 
indirectly injured parcels, but only those abutting the boundaries of the 
plan at issue.70 
However, the Knesset’s solution was ambiguously defined. The 
Hebrew term “govlim” (here translated as “abutting”) could also mean 
“bordering on” or “close” or “proximate,”71 which left open the question 
of exactly how close is “close.” By the 1990s, many landowners had 
discovered the latent ambiguity in the term “abutting” and submitted 
claims to the local planning commissions. A set of district court decisions 
 
 
 68. See supra note 19. 
 69. See supra note 26 and accompanying statutory text. 
 70. See supra note 26 and accompanying statutory text. 
 71. See Appeal to an Administrative Petition CA 2775/01 Witner v. The Sharonim Local 
Planning Comm’n [2005] IsrSC 36, 435 (including a set of dictionary definitions in this key Supreme 
Court decision). 
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accumulated where different judges interpreted this term in very different 
ways. Some took a very narrow approach, while others came close to 
reverting to the original Varon interpretation. Because of the uncertainty 
surrounding how claims would be decided or how new planning proposals 
would be affected, planning commissions, appeal boards, and landowners 
alike found their decision-making capacity stalled. 
The real estate and planning communities eagerly waited for the 
Supreme Court to clarify this issue. In September 2005, the Supreme 
Court consolidated several appeals with contradictory district court 
decisions.72 The Court held that “abutting” should, in most cases, be 
limited to physically bordering parcels.  
The Court, however, left some room for case specific interpretations by 
noting two exceptions: (1) where a “narrow road” separates otherwise 
related plots of land, or (2) where a “public footpath or narrow green strip” 
creates a similar separation. The purpose of these exceptions was to deter 
local commissions from inserting such minor separations in order to defeat 
compensation claims by nearby landowners.  
However, even the exceptions create a semantic loophole. How narrow 
is “narrow?” Inevitably, the issue will find its way to the courts again. 
c. Implications for national infrastructure 
Because the Varon interpretation extends section 197 compensation 
rights to neighboring plots,73 local planning commissions have become the 
venue for handling compensation claims for the adverse effects of major 
regional and national infrastructure. Property owners who neighbor 
highways, railways, airports, or power plants now submit claims under 
section 197.74 Prior to the Varon decision, landowners neighboring 
national infrastructure had no legal basis to claim compensation. However, 
the legal mechanism of section 197 was never intended for this purpose. 
This conclusion is supported also by the fact that claims are to be 
submitted to the local planning commissions.75 In addition, neither the 
local planning commissions nor any planning body is capable of handling 
the numerous claimants and enormous financial burden that such 
 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. See supra Part IV.A.4.a. 
 74. Prior to the Varon decision, such claims either went uncompensated or were negotiated case 
by case. 
 75. See infra Part IV.A.5. 
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infrastructure entails. A different legal and institutional format should 
have been designed for handling such claims. 
5. Who Should Pay the Compensation? 
Section 197 places the onus for paying successful compensation claims 
on the local planning commissions. However, section 197 does not 
distinguish among the various levels of plans in the national-to-local 
hierarchy of plans76 or the types of developers who stand to benefit. 
Because district plans and national plans are not exempt from 
compensation claims, a disparity arises in many situations between the 
public that the new plan serves (for example, all those who travel on 
national highways) and the public that is expected to pay the bill (the 
residents of a municipality where the highway happens to pass through).  
Initially when the number of claims nationwide was small, such 
disparities could be resolved through agreements negotiated on a case-by-
case basis among the different levels of government. Over time, however, 
more uniform rules emerged, especially those regarding national roads and 
railways. Approximately seventy percent of the compensation claims were 
to be paid by the relevant national government bodies and the remaining 
thirty percent was to be paid by local governments. This practice, as 
applied to highways, was codified by an amendment to the Planning Law; 
however, in other types of development, determining who pays for the 
compensation claims continues to be contested. 
Since 2005, when a national plan regulating the installation of cellular 
antennas was approved, cellular providers became the targets for the most 
visible conflict over the question of who should fund compensation 
claims. Neighbors of properties sold or rented out to cellular corporations 
submitted thousands of claims to local planning commissions. The local 
planning commissions argued that the municipalities should not have to 
pay compensation for a national service—especially a service operated by 
private corporations. The corporations have pressured the national 
government to solve the stalemate. This controversy has become a hot 
issue for local politicians, environmental and neighborhood organizations, 
and the media. Its resolution will likely require special legislation by the 
Knesset.  
 
 
 76. See supra Part IV.A.1.c. 
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6. Indemnification Contracts Between Developers and Municipalities 
A logical reaction to the Varon decision77 would be for local authorities 
to attempt to shift the burden to the party enjoying the enhanced rights. 
This natural reaction raises a question. How can the local authorities force 
the party that benefits from the new development to internalize the 
negative externalities rather than making the entire community pay for the 
compensation awards? 
The Varon decision gradually created a new “institution.”78 After the 
number of claims by neighboring landowners rose dramatically in the 
1990s, an increasing number of local governments started requiring 
developers to commit themselves to reimburse the municipalities for any 
compensation claims.79 This practice is still erratic, each municipality 
forming its own policies and formats. The only topic that has prompted 
local authorities to attempt to coordinate their policies has been the 
cellular antennas issue.  
As part of a broad amendment to the Planning Law in 1995, the 
Knesset revised section 198, where procedures for handling compensation 
claims are determined. The revision obliges planning commissions to 
notify any third party whose interests might be hurt by a compensation 
claim submitted, and grants such parties hearing rights. This is an indirect 
reference to the practice of indemnification agreements. 
While the Israeli Courts, unlike their Dutch counterparts,80 have not 
rejected the idea of reimbursement commitments, neither have they 
endorsed it. There are no judicial or administrative guidelines that provide 
guidance or rules for this emerging institution. As long as compensation 
claims can be submitted for externalities, where one party gains and 
another loses, indemnification contracts remain the logical and fair 
solution, but they should be regularized. 
B. Section 200: Exemptions from the Obligation to Pay Compensation 
Section 200 sets out the exceptions to the right to claim 
compensation.81 Even though the section was enacted at the same time as 
 
 
 77. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 78. A similar practice has emerged in the Netherlands. See Fred Hobma & Willem Wijting, 
Land-Use Planning and the Right to Compensation in the Netherlands, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 1 (2007). 
 79. This practice is new and uneven, and one can expect many issues to arise in the future. 
 80. See generally Hobma & Wijting, supra note 78. 
 81. The Planning and Building Law, 1965, § 200 (Isr.). 
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section 197 and was clearly intended by the legislators to serve as an 
essential buffer to compensation claims, section 200 has received less 
attention by the courts. Prior to the 1990s, the courts usually referred to 
section 200 only in passing while citing section 197. This likely reflected 
the paucity of jurisprudence submitted at that time due to the relatively 
small number of claims. Most Supreme Court decisions at the time 
focused on clarifying section 197. But once the grounds for submitting 
claims were clarified, appeals to the courts focused more on section 200. 
1. The Three Conditions of Section 200 
Section 200 contains three conditions for claiming exemptions: (1) the 
injury is caused by one of the eleven types of “provisions”—regulations 
contained in the injurious plan; (2) the harm is not reasonable; (3) the 
interests of fairness do not require compensation.82 
 
 
 82. Planning and Building Law § 200. Section 200 reads as follows: 
Exemption from payment of compensation: Land shall be deemed not to have been affected 
adversely, when it was affected by one of the following kinds of provisions of the plan, 
provided the harm does not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances of the case, 
and provided that the interests of fairness do not require compensation to be paid to the 
injured party: 
1) A change in the delineation of zones, or in the conditions of land use in them; 
2) The determination of setbacks around and between buildings; 
3) A restriction on the number of buildings in a particular area; 
4) Regulation of the sites, size and height, planned shape and external appearance 
of buildings; 
5) Permanent or temporary prohibitions or restrictions of building in a place where 
the erection of buildings on the land is liable—due to its location or nature—to 
cause dangers of flooding, of soil erosion, of dangers to health and life, or 
excessive expenditure of public funds for the construction of roads, drains, 
water supply or other public services; 
6) Prohibition or restrictions on the use of land, otherwise than by building 
prohibitions or restrictions, if the use is liable to involve danger to health or life 
or any other serious disadvantage to the vicinity; 
7) Restrictions on the manner in which buildings are used; 
8) Determination of a line, parallel to a road, beyond which no building shall 
project; 
9) Imposition of obligations to provide—near a building intended for any business, 
trade of industry—place for loading, unloading and refueling vehicles in order 
to avoid traffic obstructions; 
10) Imposition of obligations to provide—in or near a building intended for any 
business, trade or industry or for residential purposes or as a lodging house or 
for use by the public—a place for parking vehicles or a shelter or refuge against 
air raids; 
11) Provisions of a plan to which section 81 applies 
Id. (author’s trans.) (emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss1/7
p121 Alterman book pages.doc6/7/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] RIGHT TO COMPENSATION IN ISRAEL 149 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes that the three conditions are 
cumulative.83 Therefore, a local commission must prove that it fulfills each 
one of the conditions independently.  
The complex syntax of this clause and the double negative of the third 
condition merit explanation. Even if an authority has proven that the injury 
is reasonable, it will still have to pay unless it can also prove that paying 
compensation to the injured party would not be fair or just.84 
a. The interpretation of “reasonableness” and “fairness” 
Section 200 has posed the most difficulty for the courts. It has two 
parts that are so different in style that they are almost contradictory in 
form. The preamble is very evaluative and discretionary and speaks of 
“reasonableness” and “justice.” In contrast the list of the eleven types of 
provisions in plans that are exempt from compensation is very detailed, 
specific, rational, and technical.  
The courts have sidestepped this problem by almost ignoring the 
eleven-item list of exemptions. Thus, jurisprudence on the issue of 
compensation focuses entirely on two open-ended criteria: reasonableness 
and fairness. Justice Cheshin, who has written some of the Supreme 
Court’s most poetic judgments, has stated: 
Section 200 is anomalous and special. The legislature has 
transformed the local commission and first and foremost, the Court 
into legislators . . . . The criteria that the legislature has set for us to 
decide upon in compensation claims are “reasonableness” and 
“fairness” . . . . These—needless to say—are deeper than the ocean, 
higher than the skies, and one can discover everything within 
them.85 
Although the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “reasonableness” 
and “fairness” concepts began only a decade ago, it has already resulted in 
several intense debates, split court decisions, and even a recent Additional 
Hearing. As one would expect, reasonableness and fairness must be 
applied to each compensation claim on a case-by-case basis. Court 
opinions often delve deep into the philosophy, ethics, and economics of 
the relationship between planning regulation and land values. Despite the 
 
 
 83. See Additional Hearing by the Supreme Court, 1333/02 Local Planning and Bldg. Comm’n 
of Raanana v. Yehudit Horwitz [2004] SCIsr 58(6) 289 (author’s trans.). 
 84. Id. The explanation written by Judge Matza is especially instructive. 
 85. Id. § 5.  
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recent Additional Hearing, there is still no clear majority view on what 
criteria should be applied when judging reasonableness and fairness. 
Until 2004, in most of the section 200 cases, the Court focused on the 
quantitative side by examining the degree of the decline in property value. 
Initially, a case where the decline in property value exceeded thirty percent 
was declared unreasonable. Over time, cases with lower percentages of 
decline came before the Court, and the landowners won.  
b. The Horwitz case 
This declining level caused alarm among municipalities and the central 
government. When a district court ruled that a decline of only ten percent 
is unreasonable, local governments became concerned and appealed to the 
Supreme Court. The Court’s decision in Raanana vs.Yehudit Horwitz86 is 
very rich in the discussion of the various criteria that the justices suggest. 
However, a close reading shows there is no discernable majority view on 
any specific criterion for deciding what is reasonable and what is fair. 
Yehudit Horwitz and her late husband bought a plot of land in the city 
of Raanana in 1972. At the time, they could build five housing units on 
stilts. In 1983, the local planning commission reduced the number of 
permitted units to four and prohibited the building of houses on stilts. The 
appraised diminution in value was established at eleven percent. The 
district court found this was unreasonable, and the city appealed. 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the appeal, agreeing that the 
eleven percent diminution in value should be compensated. However, the 
justices did not agree on the criteria that should be applied to the case. The 
Court’s President granted an Additional Hearing with seven justices 
presiding.87 
In the original appeal decision, Justice Tirkel, in a long and detailed 
opinion, concluded that the line of reasonableness should be understood as 
de minimis and passes at the one percent to three percent mark. President 
Barak suggested a new criterion, a balancing test between the importance 
of the public purpose and the degree of injury. Applying this test, he found 
that the degree of injury in the Horwitz case was not unreasonable. 
However, he then concluded that the “fairness” criterion was not met; 
therefore, the City of Raanana could not benefit from the exceptions 
 
 
 86. CA 3901/96 Local Planning and Bldg. Comm’n of Raanana v. Yehudit Horwitz. SCIsr 56(4) 
913.  
 87. Additional Hearing 1333/02 Local Planning and Bldg. Comm’n of Raanana v. Yehudit 
Horwitz [2004] SCIs 58(6) 289 (author’s trans.). 
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clauses. Justice Zoabi joined Justice Tirkel in finding that the level of 
injury was not reasonable, but did not say explicitly whether he agreed 
with the de minimis rationale. 
Local governments feared that Justice Tirkel’s opinion would be 
regarded as the rationale of the Horwitz decision and that local authorities 
would have to compensate for any decline in value beyond two to three 
percent. Recognizing the importance of developing clearer guidance, the 
President authorized an Additional Hearing with seven justices.  
At the Additional Hearing, the justices unanimously rejected the 
appeal. However, even though Justice Tirkel changed his mind about the 
de minimis criterion, a close reading of the decision shows that there still 
was no clear majority on the criteria for reasonableness and fairness. 
Nevertheless, in a 2006 Supreme Court decision, one justice summarized 
the rationale of the Additional Hearing in Horwitz as follows: 
Reasonableness is to be determined by balancing property rights 
and the public interest. This should be done according to these three 
considerations: 
(a) the extent of decline in the injured property’s value; 
(b) the degree of “distribution” of the harm; and 
(c) an essential public interest served by the plan. 
These considerations are not a closed list; additional considerations 
that should be taken account of are left to the future development of 
jurisprudence. 
 Fairness is an open and flexible criterion, based on a variety of 
considerations. These differ from case to case, according to the 
concrete facts that come before the court.88 
In 2006, seventy years after compensation rights were first legislated, 
the Horwitz decision illustrates that there are no bright line criteria that can 
help guide planners, commissioners, lawyers, landowners, appraisers, or 
the courts as they evaluate whether a particular degree or type of injury 
will be judged compensable or exempted. From a comparative perspective, 
however, the general picture is clear: Israel has an extremely generous law  
 
 
 88. CA 8736/04 Orah Cohen v. Local Comm’n for Raanana [2006] IsrSC 34(3) (Rubenstein, J.). 
See also supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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that protects landowners and holders of lesser property rights from even 
minor reductions in property values that may be caused by planning 
decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Israel represents an “extreme point” along the range of approaches to 
compensation rights. The steep increase in the number and sizes of 
compensation claims in Israel may serve as a preview for what can happen 
when the right to compensation for regulatory takings is too broad. While 
the experiences of one country may not be easily transferable to another, 
the Israeli experience may add to the property rights debates in other 
countries.  
When Israeli property owners brought more claims and the number of 
cases increased, the courts had more opportunities to interpret the law. The 
sequence of cases gradually broadened the interpretation of compensation 
rights. In recent years, the impact of compensation claims has become a 
major consideration in almost every land-use planning decision. The 
cumulative pending claims have reached such proportions that threaten not 
only municipal budgets but also the national budget. 
From a comparative planning law perspective, by largely focusing on 
two discretionary criteria, the Supreme Court has shifted Israel’s law on 
compensation from statutory law to judge-made, quasi-constitutional law. 
Israel’s compensation law, intended by the legislators to be in the same 
family as other statute-based compensation regimes such as those in 
Germany,89 the Netherlands,90 and Sweden,91 has thus become more akin 
to American takings jurisprudence. In the United States, most states do not 
have statutory laws on compensation for regulatory takings; therefore, the 
courts are called upon to directly apply their interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
The Israeli story of compensation rights exemplifies an interesting 
relationship between written law and judge-made law. The statutory law 
regarding compensation rights has existed since 1936, and the text remains 
largely unchanged. However, the contents of the right to compensation 
changed dramatically over time. Through the prism of this rich 
 
 
 89. See Gerd Schmidt-Eichstaedt, The Law on Liability for Reduced Property Values Caused by 
Planning Decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 75 
(2007). 
 90. See Hobma & Wijting, supra note 78. 
 91. See Thomas Kalbro, Compensation Rights for Reduction in Property Values Due to Planning 
Decisions in Sweden, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 27 (2007). 
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jurisprudence, and the philosophical debates among the judges that 
characterize it, one can sense the transformation in Israel’s society and 
economy. 
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